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In many countries population ageing creates an implicit public debt. That
is, if policies remain unchanged, the public debt will ultimately become
unsustainable. This paper explores the optimal way to achieve debt sus-
tainability. In particular, it asks when policy reforms should be made, how
policies should be changed and which generations should make which con-
tributions. As regards timing, we find that policy reform should anticipate
future demographic change. As regards policy instruments, we find that
optimal policy reform features changes in all available instruments. This
implies less consumption of all types of goods; only pure public goods con-
sumption may escape a reduction. The labour supply functions of the young
and the old determine the allocation over policy instruments. In particular,
the more elastic is the labour supply of the young, the smaller should be
the increase in the tax rate on labour income; the more elastic is the labour
supply of the old, the larger should be the reduction in transfers to the
elderly. As regards generations, we find that the old share relatively little
in the fiscal burden; future generations share more or less than the young,
depending on future population size. In addition, we find that the change of
the public debt is not a given, but a feature of optimal policies. In general,
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optimal policy reform reduces the public debt in anticipation of population
ageing, but in a particular case the opposite holds true.
Keywords:




Affiliation: Ed Westerhout is affiliated with Tilburg University, Tilburg
School of Economics and Management, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg,
and with CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, sector




Population ageing is known to have far-reaching budgetary implications. In
industrialized countries populations will become dramatically older in the
decades to come: even now, the number of elderly people is projected to
more or less double relative to the number of people of working age. Since
a large part of the institutions for social security and health care is PAYG-
financed, this creates a huge implicit debt that in many cases it not matched
by an equally-sized negative statutory debt. Indeed, in many countries the
implicit debt and the statutory debt are both positive, implying that without
any policy reform, fiscal policies must be judged fiscally unsustainable.
There is a large literature that quantifies the budgetary consequences of
ageing. In the early nineties, Blanchard et al. (1990) were the first to do
so for a large number of industrialized countries. Auerbach et al. (1999)
did a similar exercise, but more explicitly from the angle of generational
accounting. Since then, a number of updates and extensions have been
made, both for individual countries (e.g. Cardarelli et al. (2000), Faruqee
and Mühleisen (2001), Congressional Budget Office (2003), Auerbach et al.
(2004), Van Ewijk et al. (2006), Smid et al. (2014)) and for groups of coun-
tries (Gokhale and Raffelhüschen (2000), Dang et al. (2001), Balassone et
al. (2009), European Commission (2012)). In addition, Börsch-Supan et al.
(2006) and Fehr et al. (2008) consider ageing in different regions in the world
and their interactions. Andersen and Pedersen (2006) focus on the impact of
economic growth upon fiscal sustainability. Furthermore, some studies allow
for a positive impact of the public debt upon the primary balance (Bohn
(1998, 2008), Medeiros (2012) and Lukkezen and Rojas-Romagosa (2016)),
although one may argue that it is more appropriate to abstract from any
future endogenous policy change.
What characterizes the literature is its focus on future projections. These
projections imply values for the implicit public debt or, after a translation
into annuity values, for the sustainability gap.1 As stressed by Blanchard
et al. (1990), sustainability gap is a technical measure without any policy
content. Indeed, one can think of a variety of policy reforms that all achieve
fiscal sustainability, but are very different in terms of policies, generations
affected and the time of policy reform.
This paper starts where the literature on fiscal sustainability ends. It
characterizes optimal policy reform as a response to news about future pop-
1The literature also uses tax gap to refer to the annuity value of the public debt. We
prefer to use the term sustainability gap in order to signal that there many ways to achieve
fiscal sustainability.
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ulation ageing. In particular, it analyzes three questions: when should the
ageing bill be paid, now or in the future? who should pay, current work-
ing generations, current retired generations or future generations? and how
should the bill be paid, by tax increases or reductions of transfers, rival
public goods or pure public goods? The paper thus focuses explicitly on
the optimal time profile of different types of policies and on how different
types of policies connect to each other. As far as I know, this paper is the
first that characterizes the optimal combination of different types of govern-
ment policies (i.e. tax policies, transfer policies, rival public goods policies
and pure public goods policies) and that elaborates the implications for the
public debt and the optimal balance between generations.
To be sure, this is not the first paper that focuses on policy reform.
Several studies focus on social security reform (e.g., Kotlikoff et al. (1999),
De Nardi et al. (1999), Beetsma et al. (2003)), pension reform (Bonenkamp
et al. (2017)) and health care reform (Roig (2006)). Kotlikoff i.e. (2007) and
Balassone et al. (2009) compare a pre-funding strategy with more gradual
fiscal adjustment. Kitao (2014), Kitao (2015) and Bloom et al. (2015)
compare different types of government policies. None of these studies digs
into the question what are the features and effects of optimal policy reform,
however. Neither is this paper the first that addresses the question whether
optimal policies feature smoothing. Indeed, Barro (1979), Aschauer (1988),
Chari et al. (1994), Andersen and Dogonowski (2004) and Werning (2007)
analyse the issue extensively. This literature does not extend the concept of
tax smoothing to other types of government policies however as occurs in
the present paper.
The model that this paper constructs is parsimonious. The model is
deterministic, contains two overlapping generations of households and de-
scribes a small open economy (factor prices are given). Households consume
what they earn, but do make a labour supply decision. The government
in the model produces rival and pure public consumption goods, spends
on transfers to the elderly and levies taxes on the labour income of the
youngsters. We distinguish between two tpes of population ageing. In the
longevity boost scenarios the old generation grows in size, whereas in the
fertility bust scenarios the young cohort shrinks in size. The two types of
scenarios have in common an increase in the old-age dependency ratio (the
size of the old cohort relative to that of the young cohort), but differ with
respect to population size. We also explore a combined scenario in which
the old-age dependency ratio increases, but the population does not change
size.
The paper draws three sets of conclusions. First, the government should
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act immediately when information about future population ageing arrives.
As the ageing of the population can often be anticipated decades ahead,
this means that - as we will show - in many cases a policy of debt reduction
should be started long before the demographic change will set in. In general,
policy reform covers all instruments of economic policies. As we will see, the
emergence of an implicit debt in general requires the government to raise tax
rates and economize on the spending on rival goods and on transfers to the
elderly. Spending on pure public goods should also be considered accordingly
but here it is not obvious a priori wether spending should be decreased or
increased (or remain unchanged). The effect of the demographic shock in
question on population size is of crucial importance in this respect and it
is here that the effects of a longevity boost and of a fertility bust will be
different. Furthermore, the labour market behaviour of the young and the
old is relevant. The paper shows that the more elastic is the labour supply
of the young, the less policy reform should rely on increasing tax rates.
Similarly, the more elastic the labour supply of the old, the more policies
should economize on transfers to the elderly.
Our second set of results regards the balance between generations. The
paper finds that all generations will be hurt by the policy reforms that
are due to population ageing, but that the generation that is old at the
time the information about population ageing arrives will bear a smaller
share of the burden. This generation escapes completely the effect of a
higher tax burden and partly the effect of a cut in rival public consumption.
The relation between the generation who is young at the time of policy
reform and future generations depends on the type of demographic shock.
If the population expands, future generations benefit more than the young
generation from the increase in public goods consumption over time that is
due to the demographic shock. Similarly, if the population shrinks, future
generations are hurt more than the generation who is young at the time of
the policy reform.
Thirdly, we find that in general policy reform reduces the public debt in
anticipation of future population ageing. Only in case ageing takes the form
of a fertility bust and the consumption of pure public goods is relatively
large, the opposite effect may occur: public debt can then be increased in
anticipation of higher primary balances which are due to cuts in future pure
public consumption. Although this case may be less relevant empirically,
we cannot exclude it a priori. This case is also a nice illustration of our
finding that the amount of public debt at the end of the planning horizon
will in general be different for different types of demographic shocks. Indeed,
different scenarios have in common that the public debt ultimately stabilizes,
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but not the level at which this occurs. In this respect, our approach differs
from the one in Dang et al. (2001), in which the public debt to GDP ratio
is set to achieve a certain level at some point in time.
The following caveats are in order. Our analysis assumes a small open
economy. It is therefore more applicable to one particular country that is hit
by an idiosyncratic demographic shock than to a large group of countries that
are hit by a common demographic shock and that respond (or anticipate)
in a coordinated way. What pleads for the assumption of a small open
economy is, first, that demographic projections for different countries differ
in the timing and the intensity of population ageing and, second, that the
policies investigated here belong to the domain of national authorities. We
will discuss the implications of this assumption below.
In addition, the paper assumes that demographic processes are exoge-
nous to economic policies. This assumption is questionable, in particular in
the long run. Empirical evidence indicates that the provision of public pen-
sions may reduce fertility (e.g., Cigno et al. (2003a) and Zhang and Zhang
(2004)) and that transfer policies may have an impact upon fertility (Cigno
et al. (2003b)). Similarly, empirical evidence indicates that public policies
(sewerage, vaccination against infectuous diseases, medical-technological in-
novation) have attributed to the increase in life expectancy during the last
few decades (Cutler et al. (2006)). Salm (2011) finds that mortality is
causally related to pension income. The exogeneity assumption thus biases
the impact that policy reform may have on fiscal sustainability. We doubt
that these considerations would undermine our proposition that population
ageing threatens fiscal sustainability, however.
Furthermore, although our stylized model allows us to study economic
policies on a fundamental level, it is less adequate for studying the effects
of concrete policy reforms. Indeed, for such kind of policy analysis one
would benefit from using models with more generations and a more detailed
modelling of policy institutions, like in Kotlikoff et al. (1999), De Nardi et
al. (1999), Beetsma et al. (2003) or Fehr et al. (2013).
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets the
stage by providing information about population ageing. Section 3 con-
structs our model and section 4 uses it to explore the properties of opti-
mal government policies. Section 5 then defines three stylized demographic
shocks and section 6 explores how they change optimal policies. Corre-
spondingly, sections 7 and 8 focus on the implications of these policies for
the generational balance and the development of the public debt over time.
Section 9 derives the contribution that each of the four policy instruments
makes to the closure of the sustainability gap. Finally, section 10 analyzes
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extended demographic shocks that generalize the stylized shocks studied
earlier, while section 11 ends with concluding remarks.
2 The demographic transition
The global features of population ageing are quite well-known. Here, we
briefly review the aspects that are most relevant for the analysis in this pa-
per. More concretely, we focus on the universality of demographic trends and
their implications for both the future age structure of the population and its
size. We restrict the discussion to 42 countries, consisting of the OECD coun-
tries and the eight major non-OECD countries (Argentina, Brazil, China,
India, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) on which both the
UN and the OECD report (OECD, 2015 and UN, 2015).
2.1 History
As regards fertility, OECD (2015) documents the development of the total
fertility rate in OECD countries between 1960 and 2013. The OECD average
dropped from 3.18 to 1.67. The total fertility rate decreased as well in all
of the individual OECD countries in this 53 years period. The same holds
true for the non-OECD countries listed above. However, the decline has lost
momentum in the last decade or so. In particular, between 2000 and 2013
the OECD average stabilized at the level of 1.67, whereas in countries such
as France, Germany and the United Kingdom the total fertility rate showed
a (slight) increase.
Developments in life expectancy share with those in fertility that they
are structural and apply to many countries in the world. UN (2015) reports
the development of life expectancy at birth between 1990-1995 and 2010-
2015. The figure for the world average increased about 10 percent in 20
years time, from 64.5 in 1990-1995 to 70.5 in 2010-2015. For 41 out of the
42 OECD and non-OECD countries listed above life expectancy at birth
increased in the 20 years period. Only South Africa, in which country life
expectancy was already very low in 1990-1995, witnessed a further decline
in the following 20 years.
The result of these two demographic forces is a strong increase in old-age
dependency ratios. OECD (2015) reports that the OECD weighted average
has increased from a level of 13.9 in 1950 to a level of 27.3 in 2015 (the
figures for the unweighted average are similar). The same result applies
to individual OECD countries: in all of them the old-age dependency ratio
increased over this period, although the magnitudes vary quite a lot. Except
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for Saudi Arabia, where the old-age dependency ratio is extremely low, the
non-OECD countries listed above show the same picture.
The effect of the combination of a drop in fertility and increasing longevity
on population growth is ambiguous. Inspection of the figures on population
growth learns that populations grew in all of the countries listed above in the
1950-2015 period (UN, 2015). This does not necessarily say that the trend
of increasing longevity was the dominant one, for it takes decades before a
drop in fertility becomes visible in figures on population growth.
2.2 Future
As regards future fertility, the OECD average total fertility rate is expected
to increase slightly to 1.85 in 2060. The trend of structural decline that oc-
curred in the last five decades or so is thus expected not to continue. Still,
the projected value of 1.85 is below replacement level. Hence, if mortal-
ity rates would remain unchanged (and net migration would be zero), the
average population would ultimately start to decline.
As regards life expectancy, projections are more in line with historical
trends. The world average of life expectancy at birth, which increased from
64.5 in 1990-1995 to 70.5 in 2010-2015, is projected to increase further to
77.1 in 2045-2050 and to 83.2 in 2095-2100. Again, the trend is universal.
It applies to all the individual countries listed above, irrespective whether
the projection ends in 2045-2050 or in 2095-2100.
The OECD projects the OECD weighted average old-age dependency
ratio to almost double in the period 2015-2075, from 27.3 to 54.5 (again, the
figures for the unweighted average are similar). Without exception, the old-
age dependency ratios are also projected to increase in the 42 countries listed
above, although the magnitudes are different. For example, the projected
old-age dependency ratio in China increases more than 250 percent, whereas
that in Germany increases less than 90 percent.
Interestingly, the picture of future population growth is very different.
UN (2015) projects continued growth of the population at the world level,
but not in all individual countries. Populations are expected to grow in
many countries, especially in the 2015-2050 period. Among them are many
European countries, the UK, the US and Indonesia. The highest growth is
expected to occur in India, in which country the population is expected to
increase from 1311 million people in 2015 to 1659 people in 2100. But there
are also many countries that will face a population decline, especially in
the 2050-2100 period. Among them again many European countries. More
important (in terms of numbers of people) are Japan where the population
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is projected to decline from 126 million people in 2015 to 83 million people
in 2100, South Korea (from 50 to 38 million people) and Russia (from 143 to
117 million people). The highest number by far applies to China however,
in which country the population is expected to decline by almost 400 million
people between 2015 and 2100 (from 1376 to 1004 million people).
Summarizing, we see that future projections of the population structure
are very different from those of population size. Populations are projected to
become older in all of the major industrialized countries. However, depend-
ing on the strength of the movements in fertility and mortality, populations
are projected to either grow or shrink.
3 A model of the ageing problem
We use two periods to describe the life cycle of households. This is a great
simplification, but not uncommon and obvious in terms of our wish to an-
alyze policy reform on a global level. Further, we will assume that both
the young and the old generation allocate their time over labour supply and
leisure (although not necessarily in equal amounts). This deviates from the
assumption commonly made in 2-cohort overlapping-generation models that
the young generation works and the old generation is retired. For this paper,
such an assumption would be too simple as we want to be able to analyze
the labour market effect of an increase of the retirement age.
Another common assumption is that households can save or dissave on
capital markets. We assume that only the government can do so and house-
holds must consume their disposable income, however. This assumption
simplifies the analysis. Moreover, to assume that there is no private saving
may be less strange as may seem at first sight. Given that many industrial-
ized countries have public programmes that provide lifelong public pensions,
households may face little incentive to change their savings upon a shock in
life expectancy or fertility. Below, we will explore the consequences of this
assumption in detail.
The two-period setup seems sufficient to model the key features of an
ageing society. Indeed, one may interpret the first period of the life cycle
as the period in between the age of 20 and the age of 50 and the second
period of the life cyle as the period in between the ages of 50 and 80, which
corresponds roughly to current economic reality.
Our model further assumes that the government supplies public goods
from which both generations benefit, that it makes transfers to the old gen-
eration and that it levies taxes on the labour income of the young generation.
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Here, transfers include income transfers and transfers in kind like health care
and long-term care services. This assumption accords with economic reality
in which the bulk of transfers is made to the elderly (that we allocate all
transfers to the old generation is obviously an exaggeration) and in which
the bulk of taxes is paid by the youngsters (that we allocate all taxes to the
youngsters is again an exaggeration). The model also accords with the lit-
erature on generational accounting which points out that net transfers from
the public sector to the private sector are generally negative in the young
stage of life and positive in the old stage in life.
Importantly, we distinguish two types of public goods. Pure public goods
conform to the standard Samuelson (1954) definition: they are non-rival and
non-excludable. Rival public goods comprise private goods that are publicly
provided and public goods that are subject to congestion. As argued in
Barro (1990), many public goods such as highways, courts, water and sewer
systems, national defense and police, may be subject to congestion: for these
goods, population growth diminishes the quality of a given amount of goods.
The model only features a labour income tax. One may ask why the
model does not include a consumption tax. In reality, both consumption
taxes and taxes on labour income generate a substantial part of total tax
revenues. In the model, the two taxes would be rather similar however: apart
from generating tax revenues, both would distort the labour-leisure decisions
of young and old households. Hence, there is no reason to include both.
Obviously, distinguishing between a labour income tax and a consumption
tax would be interesting in order to explore intragenerational heterogeneity.
However, this paper abstracts from this element. Finally, we can use a
symmetry argument to motivate our choice for a labour income tax rather
than a consumption tax: transfers in the model flow only to the elderly and
taxes are levied only on the youngsters.
3.1 Households
The intertemporal utility function of households, denoted u, consists of four
sub-utility functions: one for a composite of private consumption and labour
supply when young (ucly), one for a composite of private consumption and
labour supply when old (uclo), one for rival public consumption (ubr) and
one for pure public consumption (ubu). Intertemporal utility for the house-
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hold who is born in period t thus reads as follows:
ut = ucl






























Here, cy, co, ly and lo are used to denote private consumption during the
first and second period of the life cycle and labour supply during the first
and second period of the life cycle respectively. br denotes the volume of
rival public goods, bu the volume of pure public goods. Both types of goods
benefit generations in both stages of their life cycle. As to the (sub-)utility
functions, we assume the following. The marginal utilities of the three types
of consumption are positive and decreasing. The marginal utilities attached
to labour supply are negative. We do not impose that these marginal utilities
are decreasing, although we assume that they allow the calculation of a
meaningful solution for the household labour-leisure problems. Furthermore,
preferences for private consumption goods and labour supply are separable.2
Finally, ζt+1 denotes the survival rate of the cohort that is born in period t
and r > 0 denotes the interest rate which we will take as constant.
We do not distinguish between the individual discount rate and the inter-
est rate. This assumption is quite innocent as we abstract from any private
savings in the model. In addition, one could argue that it is appropriate to
abstract from private savings only if the individual discount rate and the
interest rate are sufficiently close to each other. Our assumption that the
two are equal takes this to its extreme.
As mentioned above, we abstract from private savings. Hence, first-
period consumption equals after-tax labour income and second-period con-
sumption the sum of labour income and transfers p,





t + pt (3)
where w denotes the wage rate and τ the rate of labour income taxation.










ω4 ∈ {∂2ucly/∂cy∂ly, ∂2uclo/∂co∂lo}.
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Equations (2) and (3) reflect that transfers are distributed only to the
elderly and, similarly, that taxes are paid only by the youngsters. Fur-
ther, they indicate that we assume that wages earned by the young and
the old are the same. This is an innocent simplification, as it would be
quite straightforward to generalize the model in this respect. Furthermore,
we will assume the wage rate grows at a constant rate g ≥ 0 to allow for
productivity growth.
Our favorite interpretation of transfers to the elderly is that of income
transfers. These income transfers will in general have an effect upon labour
supply which our analysis will take into account. For example, a reduction
of transfers that results from an increase of the pension eligibility age may
increase to some extent the labour supply of old workers. An alternative
interpretation would be transfers in kind, but then it would be more difficult
to claim that a change in transfers may have labour supply effects.
Both young and old households choose how to divide their time between
work and leisure. They thus choose their consumption and labour supply by
solving their own maximization problem. For the youngsters, the problem is
to maximize ucly (cyt , l
y
t ), subject to equation (2). Assuming that the interior










Similarly, the elderly choose their consumption and labour supply to maxi-
mize uclo (cot , l
o
t ), subject to equation (3). Assuming again that the interior











The government is assumed to maximize a social welfare function. Social
welfare, denoted as W , adds up the utility functions of all generations in-
volved. Using nyt to denote the size of the generation born in period t and







Equation (6) expresses that in determining optimal government policies,
the government takes into account the interests of all current and future
generations, including those of the currently old.
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The maximization problem is subject to the intertemporal government
budget constraint. To derive this constraint, we write down the debt accu-
mulation equation. This equation describes how the public debt develops
over time given the time pattern of taxes and expenditures. Let us denote
the public debt at the end of period t-1 as Dt−1. Further, let us denote
expenditure on rival public goods, expenditure on pure public goods, ex-
penditure on transfers and tax revenues during period t as Brt , B
u
t , Pt and
Tt respectively. As a convention, we will assume that income flows occur
at the beginning of the period to which they refer. The debt accumulation
equation can thus be expressed as follows:




t + Pt − Tt)(1 + r) (7)
We impose a solvency condition to the public sector. Technically speaking,
the government is required to have eliminated the public debt in present-





Combining the debt accumulation equation (7) and the solvency condition
(8), we arrive at the intertemporal government budget constraint:
∞∑
i=t
(Ti −Bri −Bui − Pi)
(1 + r)i−t
−Dt−1 = 0 (9)
According to this constraint, the public debt at the beginning of the planning
horizon should be redeemed by primary budget surpluses, either in the near
or in the distant future.
For future purpose, it is useful to define the implicit public debt. This
equals the negative of the first term in equation (9). Using G to denote the






i + Pi − Ti)
(1 + r)i−t
(10)
The intertemporal government budget constraint in equation (9) thus states
that the sum of the explicit and implicit public debt is equal to zero.
For tax revenues, expenditure on transfers, on pure public goods, and




















t that of the
total population in period t.
Tax revenues are proportional with the young population (equation (11))
and spending on transfers is proportional with the elderly population (equa-
tion (12)). Spending on pure public goods is not related to population size,
reflecting the nonrivalrous nature of these goods (equation (13)). Finally,
spending on rival public goods relates to the total population (equation
(14)).
Throughout the paper, we adopt a normative approach to government
policies. We do not regard this approach as superior to the positive approach
adopted by, for example, Razin et al. (2002). The reason for adopting the
normative approach merely relates to the question that this paper addresses:
what would be the optimal policy response to news about population ageing?
If we were to investigate the question whether it is likely that society will
reform optimal policies in the way that our analysis indicates, adopting a
positive approach would seem more obvious. To address this question is well
beyond the scope of our paper, however.
We can now proceed to define the problem of the government. This
is to maximize social welfare, equation (6), subject to the intertemporal
government budget constraint, equation (9), using as instruments bri , b
u
i , pi
and τi i ∈ [t,∞). More concisely, the government maximizes the following
Lagrangian,
Lt = Wt + λ
[ ∞∑
i=t





where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
Below, we will elaborate optimal government policies. In order to close
the model, we now describe how the demographic structure of the model
evolves through time.
3.3 The demographic structure
The demographic structure in this two-period model is fully determined by
the structure in the previous period and the fertility and survival rate. More
precisely, the size of the young cohort in period t, nyt , is determined by the
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size of the old cohort, not , follows from multiplying the size of the same





dependency ratio, defined as not/n
y
t , therefore equals the ratio between the
survival rate and the fertility rate: ζt/ft.
4 Optimal policies
This section does two things. First, it explores the general properties of the
four types of policies as distinguished in this paper. Second, it makes two
simplifying assumptions.
4.1 Four flavours of (non-)smoothing policies
We explore the properties of four types of policies: tax policies, transfer
policies, rival public goods policies and pure public goods policies. We start
with rival public goods policies. Elaboration of the first-order condition for
rival public goods consumption in period t yields the following equation:














(brt ) = λ (16)
Equation (16) shows two things. First, assume there is no population age-
ing, i.e. the cohorts of the young and the old, ny and no, are constant
through time. Then, it is the relationship between the social discount rate
∆ and the interest rate r that determines how consumption of the rival pub-
lic good should evolve over time. If the social discount rate is higher than
the interest rate, the marginal benefit of consumption declines more over
time than its price, rendering it optimal to decrease consumption over time.
If the social discount rate is lower, the opposite holds true. If the social
discount rate and the interest rate coincide, the optimal profile is consump-
tion smoothing. Second, suppose that, due to ageing of the population, the
old-age dependency ratio, no/ny, is larger in some period s than in other
periods. Equation (16) show that this implies relatively high consumption
of the rival public good in this period, i.e. brs > b
r
s′ where s
′ 6= s if the social
discount rate is higher than the individual discount rate. The reason is that,
if ∆ > r, the social planner gives a larger weight to the interests of the old
generation. If in some period this generation is large relative to the young
generation, then it is optimal to have high consumption in that period. If
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the social discount rate is lower than the individual discount rate, the re-
verse holds true: brs < b
r
s′ . Note that this result is driven by the size of the
old-age dependency ratio. Whether the dependency ratio is high because of
an increase in longevity or a bust in fertility is not relevant.
The following equation describes the optimal consumption of pure public
goods:













(but ) = λ (17)
Equation (17) is similar to equation (16) in one respect and different in
another one. The similarity concerns the role of the factor (1 + r)/(1 + ∆).
Absent population ageing, this factor determines whether consumption of
the pure public good should increase or decrease over time. The difference
concerns the role of demographics. A high old-age dependency ratio in some
period may now imply high consumption or low consumption, depending on
the source of the high ratio, a large cohort of elderly or a small cohort of
youngsters. Indeed, in the case of pure public goods, it is population size,
not population structure, that determines the time profile of consumption.
This echoes the peculiar feature of pure public goods: an expansion of the
population increases their marginal benefit, but not their marginal cost.
Our third case is that of transfer policies. The equation for optimal
transfer policies is a little more complex,





























where we have derived the last line by using the optimality condition that
describes the optimal allocation of available time over labour and leisure by
the old (equation (5)).
Regarding equation (18), three comments are in order. First, similar to
the previous cases, the factor (1 + r)/(1 + ∆) determines whether transfers
should increase or decrease over time. To see how, we have to elaborate
marginal utility of private consumption of the old, (∂uclo/∂co)t. Recall our
assumption that preferences are separable and that this marginal utility
function is decreasing in private consumption. If we now also assume that
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private consumption is a normal good, i.e. ∂(wtl
o
t + pt)/∂pt > 0, we have
that (∂uclo/∂co)t is negative in pt. Hence, if the social discount rate is higher
than the interest rate, it is optimal to let transfers to the elderly decline over
time; if the social discount rate is lower than the interest rate, the opposite
holds true. Second, as regards the effect of population ageing, the condition
for optimal transfers is different from those for rival and pure public goods
consumption. In particular, population ageing does not play a role here:
the optimal time profile of transfers is independent of population size and
population structure as measured by the old-age dependency ratio. The
third comment relates to the effect of labour productivity growth. Using
the expression for old-age consumption, wtl
o
t + pt, we derive that in case
labour supply of the elderly is a non-negative function of the wage rate (the
substitution effect is at least as large as the income effect), productivity
growth corresponds to a decline of transfers over time. Note that this implies
that eventually transfers will turn negative, which means that effectively the
elderly will be taxed. How long it will take before transfers turn negative
depends on initial transfers and wage income and the labour supply elasticity
with respect to the wage rate.
The last case to be considered is that of optimal tax policies. These are
described by the following equation,









































where we have derived the last line by using the condition for the optimal
allocation of available time over labour and leisure for young households
(equation (4)) and the definition of εyt as the labour supply elasticity with





As before, let us focus upon the role of ageing, discounting and labour
productivity growth in turn. First, to find the effect of discounting, elaborate
(∂ucly/∂cy)t. Due to separability, this is a function of young-age consump-
tion only, wt(1 − τt)lyt . This young-age consumption is a negative function
of the tax rate if εyt > −1, which we will assume to hold true. Hence, given
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that we assume that utility is a concave function of private consumption,
we derive that (∂ucly/∂cy)t is increasing in the tax rate. In order to sign
the derivative of 1− εyt τt/(1− τt), we assume the labour supply elasticity is
non-negative and constant or close to constant. Under these assumptions,
1 − εyt τt/(1 − τt) is decreasing in the tax rate. Hence, we conclude that
under fairly general assumptions the optimal time profile of the tax rate is
increasing over time if the social discount rate exceeds the interest rate and
decreasing over time if the interest rate exceeds the social discount rate.
Second, equation (19) shows that, like in the case of transfers, population
ageing does not exert any effect upon the optimal time profile of the tax
rate. Thirdly, we derive that, under the same assumptions as those made
above, labour productivity growth implies that the optimal tax rate will be
increasing over time.
There is no guarantee that the tax rate will lie between 0 and 100 per-
cent. We argue that this is not particularly worrisome, however. As re-
gards the upper limit, if we are willing to make the common assumption
limcy→0 ∂ucl
y/∂cy = ∞, the tax rate will never achieve a value of 100 per-
cent (although it may get quite close to it). As regards the lower limit, we
cannot make a similar statement. Indeed, according to equation (19), the
tax rate can become zero or negative at some point in the far future. We
do not think this is problematic, however. If the tax rate turns negative, a
tax turns into a subsidy and the analysis can be continued as before.
4.2 Two simplifying assumptions
Combining the above four first-order conditions, equations (16) to (19), with
the intertemporal budget constraint, equation (9), completes our model. It
solves for the optimal values of the four policy instruments in all time periods
plus the value of the Lagrange multiplier in terms of the parameters and
exogenous variables of the model. As it stands, we view the model as too
general, however. Hence, we will make two simplifying assumptions.
The first is that the social discount rate equals the interest rate, i.e.
∆ = r. The reason is that we have no information about what would be a
realistic value for the social discount rate. One might argue that the social
planner will choose the social discount rate such as to obtain consumption
smoothing over time. Absent ageing and productivity growth, this would
imply a social discount rate equal to the interest rate. Next, one might
argue that any other value for the social discount rate than the interest rate is
inappropriate as it would imply continuous one-sided redistribution between
generations. The argument for pinning the social discount rate down to the
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interest rate that we find most convincing is that it is irrelevant for many
of our conclusions regarding the impact of demographic shocks. In those
instances where it does matter, our conclusions will be biased in a direction
that is governed by the relation between the social discount rate and the
interest rate. Given that we have no firm idea about the relation between the
two, we argue that we do not loose anything by imposing equality between
the two.
The second additional assumption is that of a zero rate for labour pro-
ductivity growth. The reason for making this assumption relates to the
latter reason for pinning down the social discount rate to the interest rate:
our conclusions regarding the impact of demographic shocks do not relate
to the value assumed for labour productivity growth. In the case of pro-
ductivity growth, the argument is even more powerful. In those cases in
which productivity growth is relevant, demographics play no role and in
those cases in which demographic factors are relevant, productivity growth
does not play a role.
5 A permanent longevity boost and a temporary
fertility bust
This section explores three demographic shocks: a longevity boost, a fertility
bust and a combined shock. All three shocks are stylized by construction:
they imply an increase in the old-age dependency ratio in period 2 and an
increase, decrease or stabilization of the population in that period. More-
over, in all three cases, the changes that occur in period 2 as to population
structure and population size are permanent.
5.1 Characteristics of the shocks
In case of a longevity boost, the survival rate ζ increases in period 2 and
stabilizes at the higher level thereafter. The fertility rate remains unchanged
at its initial value, which we have taken to be unity. The longevity boost
thus increases the old-age dependency ratio and expands the population in
period 2.
In case of a fertility bust, the fertility rate f falls to a lower level in period
2. This boosts the old-age dependency ratio, but decreases the population.
In order to have a stable population in terms of size and structure after
period 2, the fertility rate returns to its initial value of unity and the survival
rate increases with factor 1/f2 in period 3.
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Figures 1 and 2 illustrate. Here, the blocks ’y’ and ’o’ correspond to the
size of the young and old cohort respectively in different time periods. The
arrows refer to the changes in fertility and mortality rate that characterize
the shocks. The combined shock (not illustrated to save space) is defined
as that linear combination of the two shocks that leaves population size
unchanged.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
One could argue that, taken together, these shocks mimic quite well the
ageing of populations across the world. As we described in section 2, old-
age dependency ratios are projected to increase everywhere, whereas the
projections of population size are more varied. This accords with the three
shocks that have in common an increase in the old-age dependency ratio,
but differ in terms of population size. On the other hand, one may object
that the increase of longevity is not a one-off change, but a more continued
process. Similarly, one may object that a permanent fall of the fertility
rate to a lower level fits the dynamics of real-world fertility better than
the temporary change in fertility that we analyze here. In order to meet
these objections, we will analyze a series of longevity increases and a more
permanent fall of fertility in section 10. The analysis of the shocks in the
present section forms the basis for that analysis.
5.2 The impact of shocks to fiscal sustainability
Let us return to the three shocks of this section. These shocks imply a
demographic change in period t=2 that becomes known in period t=1. In
all cases, the population stabilizes from period t=2 onwards (in terms of
structure and size). Hence, there is nothing in the model that changes
after period t=2. We exploit this characteristic by condensing all periods
starting from period t=2 into one ”super” period. Let us denote this period
henceforth as t=2+. Note that the t=2+ period is of infinite length, but
has, due to discounting, finite weight.
Applying this two-period structure allows us to simplify the intertem-
poral budget constraint of the government considerably. Indeed, combining
equations (9) and (11) to (14) and imposing that period 2 extends into






































The model now consists of nine equations only: the first-order conditions
in periods 1 and 2+ and the above version of the intertemporal government
budget constraint. It solves for the values of the four policy instruments in
periods 1 and 2+ plus the Lagrange multiplier.
We use this model to analyze optimal policy reform in case of a demo-
graphic shock. But it is useful to first pose the following question: what
do the three shocks imply for the implicit debt if government policies would
be left unchanged? That is, how would the implicit public debt change
when information about future demographic change became available, but
government policies would be left unchanged? To answer this question, we
calculate the implicit debt two times: one time under the assumption of ini-
tial information about demographics (and initial government policies) and
another time under the assumption of new information about demographics
(and initial policies). Then, we subtract the former from the latter. Let us
use indexes (0) and (1) to refer to initial and new and the ∆ operator to refer
to the difference between the two, i.e. ∆(x) ≡ x(1)−x(0). Further, let us for
the implicit debt use the notation Gt(x, y) in which x refers to demographic
information and y to policies. From this it follows that G0(1, 0) − G0(0, 0)
is the ageing-driven change in the implicit debt. For this change, we can
elaborate the following expression:



















Equation (21) reveals that a longevity boost (∆no2+ > 0,∆n
y
2+ = 0) increases
the implicit debt unambiguously. For a longevity boost will increase the
spending on transfers and on rival goods, whereas it will leave tax revenues
unchanged. The case of a combined shock (∆no2+ > 0,∆n
y
2+ < 0) is also
unambiguous. Indeed, a combined shock features an increase in transfers and
a fall of tax revenues. Only the case of a fertility bust (∆no2+ = 0,∆n
y
2+ <
0) is theoretically ambiguous. Although now again tax revenues will fall,
spending on rival public goods will decrease as well. If the latter change is
sufficiently large, a fertility bust will reduce rather than increase the implicit
21
debt. Empirically, the case in which tax revenues exceed public spending
on rival public goods seems most relevant.3 If we focus on that case, a
fertility bust implies an increase in the implicit debt, just like the longevity
boost and the combined shock. Then, all three types of demographic change
render public finances unsustainable.
In order to restore fiscal sustainability, policies should be changed in or-
der to reduce the implicit public debt back to its initial level. The interesting
question is how. The answer will be found by combining the nine equations
that make up our model.
6 Optimal policy reform
In order to derive the optimal response of government policies to each of
the demographic shocks, we proceed as follows. We first combine first-order
conditions (16) to (19) in order to eliminate the Lagrange multiplier and
impose our simplifying assumptions ∆ = r and g = 0. This gives us three
optimality conditions that describe the contemporaneous relation between
pure public consumption, transfers and the tax rate on the one hand and
rival public consumption on the other hand:
ntub
u′(but ) = ub



















(brt ) t = 1, 2+ (24)
3A rough look at the data tells us that tax revenues exceed the spending by governments
on rival public consumption goods. OECD (2017) reports that in 2015 the OECD average
for government revenues in terms of GDP was 38.1 percent. The corresponding figure
for government spending in terms of GDP was a little higher, 40.9 percent. Now, it is
a little ambiguous what spending items should be counted as rival public consumption,
but we can circumvent this problem by subtracting from general government spending the
spending on social protection and health care. That leaves only (1-0.326-0.187)*40.9 or
19.9 percent of GDP. As the latter figure also includes items like debt service, it serves as
an upper bound for the spending on rival public consumption goods. Hence, tax revenues
are a factor larger than spending on rival consumption goods.
One may object that we should not account for all tax revenues and that we should
also account for the fact that not all transfers accrue to the elderly. To do justice to these
objections, we would have to explore in detail how tax revenues and spending relate to
the size of the young and old cohorts. Given the prominence of transfers to the elderly
and the correlation between income and consumption (thus, the correlation between the
revenues from income and consumption taxation) in many industrialized countries, we do
not think such an exercise would yield a different result, however.
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Next, we totally differentiate these equations. In general, differentiation
may not appropriate since the relations between the various variables are
non-linear and the demographic shocks that we study are not marginal,
but discrete. However, as I show in the appendix, the coefficients of the
differential equations have unambiguous sign. Hence, total differentiation
gives correct answers on a qualitative level.
Total differentiation of equations (22), (23) and (24) gives us equations
(25), (26) and (27) respectively,
dbut = B̂tdb
r










t t = 1, 2+ (27)
where we have relegated the definition of the coefficients B̂t, Ĉt, P̂t and T̂t
to the appendix. The appendix shows that each of the coefficients can be
signed. In particular, B̂t > 0, Ĉt > 0, P̂t > 0 and T̂t < 0.
This system of differential equations is not complete: it consists of three
equations and four variables. It can be completed by adding the budget
constraint. But before doing so, it is useful to take a look at equations (25)
to (27).
First, equation (26) tells us that the change in transfers will always
be in the same direction as the change in rival public consumption. This
result holds true in both periods and in all three demographic scenarios.
Similarly, equation (27) indicates that the change in the tax rate and the
change in rival public consumption have opposite sign, in both periods and
in all three scenarios. Subsequently, equation (25) tells us that pure public
consumption and rival public consumption will change in an equal direction
in two cases: in period 1 in each of the three scenarios and in period 2+ in the
combined shock scenario. Only in period 2+ of the longevity boost scenario
and fertility bust scenario we cannot derive whether the two variables will
move in the same or in opposite direction.
Equations (26) and (27) also inform us about the role of labour supply
behaviour. I have expressed coefficient P̂t in equation (26) as a function
of εot , the negative of the labour supply elasticity of the old with respect
to the transfer, i.e. εot ≡ − (dlot /dpt) / (lot /pt). As the appendix shows,
P̂ ′t(ε
o
t ) > 0. The economic meaning of this result is that the more elastic
is the labour supply of the old, the larger will be the change in transfers
relative to other policy instruments. Indeed, the more a cut in transfers
to the elderly increases their labour supply, the more effective is the policy
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reform: it not only reduces spending on transfers, but also increases the
revenues from taxing labour income.
For the young, a similar result holds true. I have expressed coefficient
T̂t in equation (27) as a function of ε
y
t , which has been defined in section
4 as the labour supply elasticity of the young with respect to the after-tax
wage rate. The appendix demonstrates that T̂ ′t(ε
y
t ) > 0. Hence, the more
elastic is the labour supply of the young, the smaller will the change in tax
rates relative to other policy instruments. Intuitively, the more an increase
in tax rates makes the young reduce their labour supply, the less effective is
the policy reform as lower labour supply reduces the revenues from labour
income taxation.
In order to derive how each of the policy instruments is adjusted as a
response to the news about ageing, we now complete the system of differen-
tial equations. Total differentiation of the intertemporal budget constraint











2+. Using equations (25), (26) and (27) and the first-
order condition with respect to rival public consumption policies, equation
(16), we can eliminate all policy variables except dbr1 (see the appendix for


















The definition of coefficient Ê and its relation to the coefficients introduced
in equations (25) to (27) can be found in the appendix. The appendix also
derives that Ê > 0. Equation (28) is the basis for the model: combining the
results in this equation with equations equations (25), (26), (27) and (16),
we can derive closed-form expressions for all policy variables in the model.
What does this tell us about the effects of a longevity boost and a fertility
bust? First of all, optimal policies change immediately upon the arrival of
new information about a future demographic change. This may be obvious
to many, but a key message for some others: policies should be reformed
(long) before the population has started to age.
Next, a longevity boost unambiguously reduces rival public consumption
and transfers and unambiguously increases the tax rate, both in period 1 and
period 2+. In addition, period-1 pure public consumption is also reduced;
only the change of period-2+ pure public goods consumption is ambiguous.
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The increase in the shadow price calls for lower period-2+ consumption,
whereas the increase of the population in that period has the opposite effect.
The case of a fertility bust is different, even if we assume, as explained
in section 5, that a fertility bust will make the public debt unsustainable.
First, period-2+ consumption of the pure public good will now definitely be
reduced. The increase in the shadow price and the shrinking of the popu-
lation in period-2+ cooperate to reduce optimal consumption of the pure
public good in that period. Second, the effects on rival goods consumption,
transfers and the tax rate in periods 1 and 2+ are now ambiguous. Indeed, if
the reduction of pure public goods consumption in period 2+ is sufficiently
large, there will be room to increase rival goods consumption and transfers
and to reduce the tax rate. If the role of pure public goods is less large,
a fertility bust will call for lower rival goods consumption, lower transfers
and higher tax rates, as in the case of a longevity boost. But even then, the
policy implications of a fertility bust will be less dramatic than those of a
longevity boost.
Finally, we can use equation (28) also to explore the role of labour supply
behaviour. The appendix writes Ê as a function of the four labour supply











and that ∂Ê/∂εy1, ∂Ê/∂ε
y
2+ < 0. This basically confirms the results derived
earlier. The required change in rival public consumption will be unambigu-
ously smaller the more elastic is labour supply of the elderly; it will be
unambiguously larger the more elastic is labour supply of the youngsters.
7 Evolution of the public debt
This section explores the evolution of the public debt. Note that nowhere we
imposed a time path or end value for the public debt. Rather, we must derive
it, using the results derived in the previous section for optimal policies.
We adopt a two-step approach. In the first step, we derive a generic
formula for the change in the public debt. In the second step, we apply the
formula to optimal policies in periods 1 and 2+.
The first step starts from noting that sustainable public finances imply
a zero value for the total of explicit and implicit debt:
Dt +Gt = 0 −→ Dt = −Gt (29)
Hence, taking first differences yields a simple formula for the evolution of
the public debt:
∆Dt = −∆Gt (30)
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Recall that the implicit debt is defined as the present value of primary
deficits,












t + Pt − Tt (32)
Now, combining equations (30) and (31) allows us to write ∆Dt as the
following function of Gt−1 and Ft:
∆Dt = −rGt−1 + (1 + r)Ft (33)
The second step is to apply equation (33) to t = 1. Note that in the case
of the shocks studied thus far F stabilizes at the level it achieves in period
t = 2+. Let us denote this level as F̄ . This then gives a very simple result:
the change in the public debt along the optimal path in period 1 is opposite







+ (1 + r)F1 = −(F̄ − F1) (34)
As noted above, optimal policies in case of a longevity boost imply an in-
crease of the primary deficit from period 1 to period 2+. The same holds
true for the combined shock. Hence, in both cases the public debt falls in
period 1. As mentioned earlier, the case of a fertility bust is different. In
case of a fertility bust, the change in the primary deficit from period 1 to
2+ can a priori not be signed as the spending on rival and pure public goods
falls from period 1 to period 2+. The sign of the change in the public debt
is then also ambiguous.
What about ∆D2+? Intuitively, one would expect a zero change in
period 2+ as the population structure and size do not change after period 1







+ (1 + r)F̄ = 0 (35)
8 The impact on the generational balance
What does optimal policy reform imply for the balance between generations?
We will address this question now. In particular, we analyse the generational
implications of the four policies in turn.
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Let us start with tax policies. As shown, optimal tax policies feature
smoothing of the tax rate over time. Consequently, the young and future
generation will be hurt to the same extent by optimal tax policies. The cur-
rently old are not hurt by tax policy reform. As their income goes untaxed,
they escape the higher tax rate. One may disagree with the latter finding as
it hinges upon an assumption that is in reality often not true (a zero tax rate
on the labour income of the elderly), but this would be an overstatement.
The elderly often face lower rates than the youngsters and their labour sup-
ply is (much) lower that that of younger cohorts. Generalizing our model in
this respect would confirm our finding that tax policy reform will hurt the
old less than the other generations.
The case of optimal transfer policies is different. Like optimal tax poli-
cies, optimal transfer policies exhibit smoothing. Unlike optimal tax policies,
they treat the currently old in the same way as other generations however.
Indeed, optimal transfer policy reform achieves perfect balance between all
generations involved.
The case of optimal rival public goods policies is similar to that of optimal
tax policies. Again, the smoothing principle applies and, again, the effect on
the generation that is old at the time of policy reform is smaller than that on
other generations. In this case, the old generation faces lower consumption
in one stage of her life cycle only.
The case of pure public goods policies is different from the other types
of policies as the smoothing principle does not apply. For that reason, the
future generation will be hurt more (in case of a fertility bust) or less (in
case of a longevity boost) than the generation who is young at the time of
policy reform.
9 How large is the fiscal impact of the four policy
instruments?
A question not addressed thus far concerns the contributions that the dif-
ferent policy instruments make to the closure of the sustainability gap.4 In
particular, how large are the contributions made by the four instruments
and how do these relate to the intensity and form of ageing?
In order to explore these questions, we derive an expression for the policy-
driven reduction of the implicit debt which, referring to the notation we
introduced earlier, we denote as G0(1, 0)−G0(1, 1). The expression consists
4In this section, we will assume that also a fertility bust implies a sustainability gap.
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of four components and can be interpreted as the counterpart of equation
(21) for the decomposition of the ageing-driven change in the implicit debt,








where we use as shortcuts N , defined as n1 + n2+/r and, similarly, N
y,
defined as ny1 +n
y
2+/r and N
o, defined as no1 +n
o
2+/r. Furthermore, we have
omitted the time indices to the policy variables in case they have identical
values in periods 1 and 2+.
Note that the policy-driven reduction in the implicit debt in equation
(36) is exactly equal to the ageing-driven increase in the implicit debt, as
formulated in equation (21). This can be derived formally by noting that the
intertemporal budget constraint implies that G0(0, 0) = G0(1, 1) = −D0.
Using equation (36) and the fact that we know the value of G0(1, 0) −
G0(1, 1), we can now define the contributions that each of the four types
of policies make to the reduction of the implicit debt. Let us denote the
contributions of rival public consumption policies, pure public consumption


















Expressions for ∆p, ∆br and ∆(τwly) can be obtained by taking the discrete
analogues of equations (25) to (27). The implied relation between ∆p and
∆br is independent of demographics (as reflected in equation (26)). The
same holds true for the relation between ∆(τwly) and ∆br (as reflected in
equation (27)). Further, note that population ageing as we have defined it,
i.e. an increase in the old-age dependency ratio that can be accompanied by
an increasing, a decreasing or a stable population, increases No relative to
N and decreases Ny relative to N . Hence, we derive that the contribution
made by transfer policies is relatively large and the contribution made by
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tax policies relatively small. In addition, the larger is the increase in the
old-age dependency ratio, the larger is the contribution made by transfer
policies and the smaller that made by tax policies. Whether the increase in
the old-age dependency ratio is due to an expansion of longevity or a fall of
fertility is not relevant.
Our model is too general to infer something about the contribution of
pure public consumption policies. In order to gain more insight, let us
therefore adopt a more specific formulation. In particular, let us assume that




and ubu(but ) = (b
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φ respectively, with 0 < φ < 1. Equation (22) now




t where t = 1, 2+ and j = 0, 1. If we use
this condition to elaborate (the discrete analogue of) equation (25), we can












where we use as a shortcut M(1), defined as n1(1)
1/(1−φ) +n2+(1)
1/(1−φ)/r.
For this more specific case we derive that the contribution of spending
on the pure public good relative to that of spending on the rival public good
falls in case of a longevity boost and increases in case of a fertility bust.
This echoes the results derived earlier about the implications of population
size for spending on the pure public good.
10 A series of boosts in longevity and a permanent
fall of fertility
As explained above, the longevity shock that we have studied thus far - a
one-time decline of the model’s mortality rate - is at odds with the prospect
of mortality rates permanently declining. A series of adverse shocks in the
mortality rate seems more realistic. Therefore, we now turn to this case.
Particularly, we will assume that the mortality rate declines for N successive
periods rather than one period. After these N periods, the mortality rate
stabilizes at the period-N+1 level (the first decline occurs in period 2, as
in section 5). Basically, this case extends the period of demographic change
from 1 to N periods.
As regards fertility, we follow a similar reasoning. Projections embody
more a permanent fall rather than a temporary fall of the fertility rate as
assumed thus far. Hence, we will now study the case of a permanent fall of
29
the fertility rate. Like in the longevity case, this boils down to prolonging
the period of the shock that we analyzed before from 1 to N periods. In
particular, we assume that the fertility rate falls in period 2 and remains at
the new lower level until period N + 1. In period N + 2, the fertility rate
returns to its original value, unity, and the mortality rate increases such as
to stabilize the population structure from period N + 1 onwards.
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
10.1 Policy implications
Figure 3 and 4 display the projected changes of the population in case of
an extended longevity shock and fertility shock. The figures reveal that
the extended shocks produce more interesting demographic dynamics than
the two stylized shocks studied before. Still, in one important aspect, the
implications for optimal policies are not basically different. Again, transfer
policies, rival public goods policies and tax policies adhere to the smoothing
principle, whereas the profile of pure public goods consumption is driven by
that of population size.
In another aspect, there are differences. The extended longevity shock
features N successive increases in old-age dependency ratio and population
size. Hence, the implied increase of the implicit debt will be larger than
in case of a one-time drop in the mortality rate. The same applies to the
changes in instruments that correspond to optimal policies. The period-
1 changes in the consumption of rival and pure public goods, transfers to
the elderly and the labour income tax rate all magnify the corresponding
changes in the case of a stylized shock.
The case of an extended fertility shock is more peculiar. When it comes
to population structure, it is similar to the stylized shock. In both cases the
old-age dependency ratio increases in period 2 and stabilizes at the higher
level thereafter. But, unlike the case of a stylized shock, the case of an
extended fertility shock features a series of declines in population size. The
extended shock thus exhibits larger declines in tax revenues and spending on
rival public goods. In addition, the extended shock also features spending
cuts on transfers to the elderly. For, unlike the stylized shock, the fertility
bust now also reduces the size of future old-age cohorts. Due to this, it
is more difficult to pin down the sign of the effect of demographic change
upon the implicit public debt. Depending on the initial composition of
the government budget, the implicit debt may still increase, but it may
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also remain unchanged or even decrease.5 However, if the fertility shock
increases the implicit debt, the four policy instruments will change as before.
We can obtain more insight into these issues by elaborating the gener-
alization of equation (28) for extended shocks. The appendix derives that












































Equation (42) reveals that an extended longevity shock is a straightforward
generalization of a stylized longevity shock. As the extended shock is char-
acterized by dn̄o > dnoN > ... > dn
o
2 > 0, dn̄
y = dnyN = ... = dn
y
2 = 0,
equation (42) tells us that, following the arrival of information about an ex-
tended longevity shock, optimal policies imply an immediate cut in spending
on rival public consumption goods. Equation (42) also shows that the ex-
tended fertility shock does not generalize the stylized fertility shock. The
extended fertility shock is characterized by dn̄y < dnyN < ... < dn
y
2 < 0,
dn̄o < dnoN < ... < dn
o
3 < 0, dn
o
2 = 0. The sign of the effect upon b
r
1 is
now ambiguous. The permanent decline of the fertility rate makes both the
younger cohort and the older cohort shrink. Both the impact upon the im-
plicit public debt and upon the period-1 cut in public spending on the rival
public good depend on the initial composition of the government bdget and
cannot unambiguously be signed.
5That the effect of a fertility bust upon the implicit debt may be negative is indeed
confirmed by studies like Smid et al. (2014) who find that a higher fertility rate will
increase the implicit debt. According to this study, the extra tax revenues paid by a new
person cannot compensate for the extra government transfers (spending on education,
pensions and health care) to this person. This illustrates that in general the effect of a
fertility shock upon the implicit debt relates to the composition of the government budget.
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10.2 Implications for the public debt
Also interesting is what the extended shocks imply for the development of
the public debt. Intuitively, as demographic change extends further into the
future, there is more time to anticipate future demographic changes and this
may affect the time path of the public debt.
To find an expression for the evolution of the public debt, we adopt the
expression for the change in the debt as derived in section 7, equation (33).
We now impose that the primary deficit stabilizes at the level F̄ in period
N + 1. This then gives the following expression for the change in the public













+ (1 + r)F1
= −(F2 − F1)−
1
1 + r
(F3 − F2)− ...−
1
(1 + r)N−1
(F̄ − FN ) (43)
This expression for the change in the public debt generalizes that in equation
(34). Now the change in the public debt is the opposite of the sum of the
discounted changes in the primary deficit in all subsequent periods. As
before, as optimal policies imply anticipation to future changes, the change
in the debt in period 1 reflects future changes in the primary deficit.
The development of the public debt in subsequent periods can be derived
by repeated application of equation (33). For illustration, I give here the
expressions for periods 2, N and N+1 (the latter two mimic earlier results):
∆D2 = −(F3 − F2)−
1
1 + r
(F4 − F3)− ...−
1
(1 + r)N−2
(F̄ − FN ) (44)
∆DN = −(F̄ − FN ) (45)
∆DN+1 = 0 (46)
These equations demonstrate again that the development of the public debt
over time is endogenous and a reflection of optimal policies. Indeed, the
behaviour of the public debt will depend on demographic dynamics and the
public institutions in the country that is being analyzed. Without making




Three assumptions warrant further discussion. The first concerns the ab-
sence of a private capital market. The second is the concept of a small open
economy. The third is that the population consists of two generations only.
11.1 Private capital market
Throughout the paper, we have assumed there is no private capital market.
This assumption simplifies our derivations. Moreover, it is not crucial for
our analysis. To illustrate, let us review what would happen if we relaxed
this assumption.
First, allowing households to save and dissave changes the scope of tax
and transfer policies. Indeed, in our model the government uses tax and
transfer policies to obtain what households, absent a capital market, cannot
achieve: the smoothing of their consumption over the life cycle. If we in-
stead assumed there is a perfect capital market, the government would use
transfer and tax policies such as to minimize distortions. This would bring
government policies closer to optimal policies. Our focus is not on optimal
policies, however. Rather, our focus is on optimal policy reform upon the ar-
rival of news about a future ageing shock. So, the relevant question is what
are the implications for optimal policy reform once we allow households to
save and borrow on a perfect capital market?
Allowing private savings to respond to policy reform changes two of the
differential equations that describe optimal policy reform, namely equations
(26) and (27). For details, see the appendix. This appendix shows that
allowing for private savings will increase T̂t in equation (27). Hence, the
government will rely more heavily on tax hikes to tackle the ageing prob-
lem. The reason is that now households can adjust their savings to protect
their consumption when young from falling too much in case of a tax hike.
Similarly, P̂t in equation (26) will increase from period t = 2 onwards. The
reason is similar. The elderly, when young, anticipate upon the change in
transfers when old by adjusting their saving. The government explores this
type of self-insurance by relying more on transfer policies. (Obviously, the
elderly in period 1 cannot anticipate. In period 1, therefore, equation (26)
will remain unchanged.)
Apart from these results, our analysis remains valid. Endogenizing pri-
vate saving does not change our result that optimal policy reform requires
policies in period 1 to anticipate to changes in future periods, that optimal
policy reform requires changes in all four instruments and that optimal pol-
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icy reform will be different for a longevity boost and a fertility on account
of pure public goods.
11.2 Small open economy
Up till now, we implicitly assumed that demographic shocks do not change
the interest rate (and wage rate). However, simulation models (Miles, 1999;
Börsch-Supan et al., 2006) suggest that population ageing will reduce the
interest rate (and raise the wage rate). This in itself may change optimal
policies. Indeed, given that capital income is relatively important for older
generations and labour income is relatively important for younger genera-
tions, one would expect that the combination of a lower interest rate and a
higher wage rate implies that optimal policy reform puts a heavier load on
younger generations.
This brings us to the assumption that the economy under consideration is
small. If the economy under consideration, instead, is large, the assumption
that the interest rate (and wage rate) is a given may be inadequate. Indeed,
policies of public saving (debt reduction) may imply a fall of the interest
rate. This in itself will increase the implicit public debt and require further
policy adjustments. Hence, policies of public debt reduction may become
less attractive when the country in consideration is sufficiently large. I do not
expect that this will affect the balance between different policy instruments,
but do expect that it will change the profile of optimal policy adjustment
over time. This is also the conclusion of earlier contributions to the literature
(Cutler et al. (1990), Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000)). To investigate this
further is a natural topic for further research.
11.3 A 2-OLG model
Another assumption of our analysis is that the life cycle of households con-
sists of two periods only. Obviously, this is a caricature of reality, but the
question is whether this is relevant for our analysis. Suppose we would as-
sume instead that the life cycle of households consists of 60 or 80 years, as
is more common in the literature. How would this change the results of our
analysis? The answer is there would not be any substantial changes, except
for one point. That is that this modification would increase the number of
policy instruments. In particular, optimal policies would feature changes in
age-specific taxes and transfers to the elderly. A clear example of why this
is relevant can be found in the labour market position of the (young) elderly
who are still active on the labour market and the (old) elderly who have fully
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retired. The difference in labour market elasticities between the two groups
would imply that upon a demographic shock as studied here the transfers to
the former group would have to be reduced more than the transfers to the
former group. Similarly, also other age groups that feature different labour
market elasticities would require different policy changes.
This raises another issue, which is that external factors may hinder op-
timal policy reform. To return to the example just mentioned, policy in-
struments often do not differentiate with respect to age in the way that is
required by economic analysis. One example that also applies to the stylized
model in this paper are restrictions on the development of the public deficit
and debt. The Stability and Growth Pact of the EU, for example, imposes
restrictions on the deficit to GDP ratio and the debt to GDP ratio that
our analysis did not take into account. A third example concerns the un-
certainty by which demographic projections are surrounded in reality. This
uncertainty may be a reason (and may have been a reason in the past) not
to implement radical changes before the ageing of the population has (did)
really set in. These examples demonstrate that our analysis does not give
answers to all relevant questions and that, in order to complete the picture,
more analysis is required.
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Appendix
Coefficients of equations (25) to (27): definition





















































Coefficients of equations (25) to (27): sign
Given the properties of the sub-utility functions, B̂t and Ĉt can be shown
to be unambiguously positive. For P̂t to be positive, we need one additional
assumption, namely that 1−εotwlot /pt > 0. This is equivalent to dcot/dpt > 0.
This means that for the elderly private consumption is a normal good, an
assumption that will very likely hold true.
In order to sign T̂t, we review three terms in the expression for T̂t. The
first is 1− εyt τt/(1− τt). This is the effect of a change in the tax rate upon
tax revenues. Assumed the economy is on the normal part of the Laffer
curve, this term will be positive. The second term to explore is 1 + εyt . We
do not want to exclude the case of a negative labour supply elasticity: it is
a real possibility that the income effect of a change in the wage rate exceeds
the substitution effect. An elasticity smaller than -1 is very implausible,
however, so 1 + εy1 can safely be assumed to be positive. The third term
to consider is the denominator of the expression for T̂t. Zero and constant
positive values for εyt render this term positive. It is difficult to exclude
a priori that the labour supply elasticity of the youngsters is so negative
that it renders the denominator negative, however. In order to gain more
insight, let us elaborate a specific case. Suppose that ubr
′












t independent of τt. In this specific
case, the sign of the denominator of the expression for T̂t equals the sign
of εyt + CRRA(1− τt)(1 + ε
y
t ), where CRRA, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion of the two sub-utility functions, equals 1 − γ. Even if we take
conservative estimates for CRRA, τt and ε
y
t , this term will be positive.
Suppose for example that CRRA = 1, τt = 0.50 and ε
y
t = −0.25. Then,
εyt + CRRA(1 − τt)(1 + ε
y
t ) = 0.125. Likely, CRRA is higher than 1 and
εyt is less negative than -0.25, whereas in many countries τt is lower than
50 percent, even if we interpret the tax rate as an indication of all types of
taxation rather than taxation of labour income taxation alone. Thus, we
must conclude that εyt + CRRA(1 − τt)(1 + ε
y
t ) will likely be higher than
0.125. Hence, we assume henceforth that this term is positive.
Coefficients of equations (25) to (27): properties





tively. What can we say about the derivatives? Inspection of equation (49)
reveals that P̂ ′t(ε
o
t ) > 0. Inspection of equation (50) demonstrates that a
higher value for εyt reduces the absolute value of T̂t(ε
y
t ), both on account of
a denominator effect and a numerator effect. Since T̂t(ε
y
t ) < 0, this means
that T̂ ′t(ε
y
t ) > 0.
Derivation of equation (28)
Total differentiation of the intertemporal government budget constraint,




























































Upon using equations (25) to (27) for t = 1 and t = 2+, we can eliminate a








(br2+ + Ĉ2+ + p2+)
r
dno2+ +













t τt/(1−τt))T̂t for t = 1, 2+.
Given the assumptions made above, Ê1 and Ê2+ are positive.
In order to eliminate dbr2+, we apply equation (16) to t = 1 and to
t = 2+, eliminate the Lagrange multiplier and totally differentiate. This




where Î equals ubr
′′
(br1)/ub
r′′(br2+). Given the properties of the sub-utility
functions, Î > 0.
Equation (52) can now be further reduced. This gives us equation (28)
in the main text, which relates dbr1 to the demographic shocks,
dbr1 = −








where Ê is defined as Ê1+Ê2+Î/r. Note that Ê > 0, given that Ê1, Ê2+, Î >
0.
The role of the labour supply elasticities of the young and the old can
be easily derived. Upon using the definitions of Ê, Ê1 and Ê2+ and the
results P̂ ′t(ε
o












The case of extended shocks
In order to derive equation (42) in the main text, we start formulating the
applicable version of the intertemporal government budget constraint. This
follows from combining equations (9) and (11) to (14) and imposing that
period N+1 extends into the far future. This implies the following version
42

























































where we use the notation x̄ to refer to the value of x from period N+1
onwards.
We now have to make two steps to arrive at equation (42). The first step
is to totally differentiate equation (55) and to use equations (25) to (27) to
eliminate all policy variables other than br. The second step is to use the
counterparts of equation (53) for the case of extended shocks to eliminate






































where we recall our definition of Êj and apply a similar definition for
¯̂
E:















Using equation (57), we arrive at equation (42) in the main text.
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The case of endogenous private savings
Allowing households to engage in private savings changes two conditions for
optimal policy reform: the relation between the optimal reform of transfer
policies and that of rival goods policies (equation (26)) and the relation
between the optimal reform of tax policies and that of rival goods policies
(equation (27)). We will review these two relations in turn.
In the main text, equation (26) expresses the relation between the opti-
mal reform of transfer policies and that of rival goods policies. It is useful













If we now assume that households can save and borrow on the capital market














(1− εotwlot /pt − ηot (1 + r)st−1/pt)
(60)
where ηot is defined as the negative of the elasticity of private saving with
respect to transfers to the elderly, i.e. ηot ≡ −(dst−1/dpt)(pt/st−1).
As regards equation (59), we have assumed that 1 − εotwlot /pt > 0.
If this condition were not true, private consumption would be an infe-
rior good, which we regard an implausible assumption. We now make
the same assumption in the context of equation (60), which implies that
1− εotwlot /pt − ηot (1 + r)st−1/pt > 0.
In order to derive the implication for dpt/db
r
t of endogenizing private
saving, we must make an assumption about (∂2uclo/(∂co)2)t. A benchmark
assumption is that initially the saving constraint is not binding, so that
allowing households to save does not change their initial consumption profile.
Then, endogenizing private saving will increase dpt/db
r
t by increasing η
o
t from
zero to some positive value. Alternatively, we can assume that intially the
saving constraint is binding, so that allowing households to save increases
their initial saving. This requires the third derivative to be positive, i.e.
(∂3uclo/(∂co)3)t > 0, an assumption that holds true for common utility





The second equation to review is that between tax policies and rival
goods policies (equation (27)). We repeat it here in its full form (for trans-






















































where ηyt is defined as the elasticity of private saving with respect to the after-
tax wage of young workers, i.e. ηyt ≡ (dst/d(wt(1− τt)))((wt(1− τt))/st).
As regards (1 + εy)wlyt , we have assumed before that it is positive. That
means, that whatever the labour supply response to a tax hike, a tax hike
will decrease the consumption of young workers. Now, we make a similar
assumption: (1+εy)wlyt −η
y
t st/(1−τt) > 0. This means that although work-
ers may increase their labour supply and also reduce their private savings,
a tax hike will always lower the consumption of young workers.
Given this assumption, we derive for equation (62) that |dτt/dbrt | > 0
if the allowance for private saving does not change the initial consumption
profile. If the allowance for saving induces households to save (and if again
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Figure 4: Extended shock: a permanent fertility bust
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